Summary. This article focused on the definition and the study of a binary Bayesian criterion which measures a statistical agreement between a subjective prior and data information. The setting of this work is concrete Bayesian studies. It is an alternative and a complementary tool to the method recently proposed by Evans and Moshonov (2006) . Both methods try to help the work of the Bayesian analyst in preliminary to the posterior computation. Our criterion is defined as a ratio of Kullback-Leibler divergences ; two of its main features are to make easy the check of a hierarchical prior and be used as a default calibration tool to obtain flat but proper priors in applications. Discrete and continuous distributions exemplify the approach and an industrial case-study in reliability, involving the Weibull distribution, is highlighted.
Motivation
Among the large number of industrial case-studies involving, in subjective Bayesian frameworks, the posterior distribution of the parameter θ ∈ Θ of a decision-making model M(θ), many of them mention its undesirable behavior when the prior information threatens to be conflicting with the information brought by the observed data yn = (y1, . . . , yn) ∼ M(θ) (Evans and Moshonov 2006 , Bonnevialle and Billy 2006 . The term "conflicting", introduced by the first authors, has originally been specified as follows: the prior distribution favors region of Θ far from the frequentist confidence region brought by yn. The objective knowledge yielded by the likelihood L(yn; θ) can thus be littered by the choice of a wrong prior and the Bayesian analyst can take a posterior decision with unwelcome consequences. In case of highly censored data and small sample sizes, when the Bayesian informative approach is highly recommended (Robert 2001) , the heterogeneity of the data random variables in the sample space χ n with a probability density function (pdf) f (x|θ) and a distribution function F (x|θ). Denote S(x|θ) = 1 − F (x|θ). The pdf is defined with respect to a dominating (unwritten) measure which is usually Lebesgue. However, some of our examples will use discrete measures. Let θ ∈ Θ and denote d = dim Θ < ∞. In Section 7 we will consider a case where the observed sample yn contains r uncensored i.i.d. data xr = (x1, . . . , xr) following M (θ) and n − r fixed (type-I) right-censored values, denoted c n−r = (c 1 , . . . , c n−r ). Thus, the observed likelihood can be written as
S(c i |θ).
Similarly to f , any prior or posterior measure on θ will be denoted π and is dominated by a discrete or continuous reference (unwritten) measure on Θ. Remind that π (and by extension the prior distribution) is said proper if and only if π is a density, i.e. Θ π(θ)dθ = 1.
The EMo procedure
To our knowledge, Evans and Moshonov's work (2006) seems to be the first one dedicated to check prior-data conflicts that lays on statistical foundations rather than rules of thumb. They consider the marginal prior distribution M T of a minimal sufficient statistic T with sampling density f T (t|θ).
This distribution has density
If the observed statistic t o = t(y n ) is a surprising value for M T , namely when the marginal p−value
is extreme, then a conflict is detected. This typically occurs when FT (to) ≤ 0.05 or FT (to) ≥ 0.95.
In this case, as these authors say, "the data provide little or no support to those values of θ where the prior places its support". A difficulty however occurs when a component U of T is an ancillary statistic, namely a statistic whose distribution does not depend on θ (Ghosh et al. 2007 ). Thus no prior-data conflict concerning U can be highlighted and the marginal distribution threatens to reflect more the behavior of the sampling model fT (.|θ) than the prior distribution. Hence it is necessary to compute the p−value of the conditional marginal distribution
When the prior is hierarchised (Evans and Moshonov 2007) , similar conditional checks have to be carefully set up. Despite the difficulty to choose good sufficient and ancillary statistics, and the computational complexity which rises when no sufficient statistic exists (when M(θ) does not belong to the natural exponential family), this method is an intuitive, powerful tool, whose performance is shown throughout numerous examples in the two articles previously cited.
There is however a difficulty, for the Bayesian analyst, to work with p−values. A wrong but common idea is to consider them as probabilities of conflict between θ ∼ π and y n ∼ M(θ). Seen as a decision tool in a test, the p−value is a random variable following a uniform distribution under the null hypothesis. As Berger (2000, 2003) recommend, p−values must be carefully used; the understanding of the result could thus be mistaken for industrial analysts that are not statisticians. Another issue is that a binary definition of a conflict can be preferred in applied studies (Bonnevialle and Billy 2006) , especially when data can be removed or added in sensitivity studies. Choosing a couple of p−values threshold can be difficult: why should we choose (5%, 95%) percentiles rather than (2%, 98%) ? We propose in next section another definition of conflict which settles this issue. When the EMo conflict is uniquely defined in term of location in the sample space through the choice of a sufficient statistic, which induces indirectly a conflict in the parameter space, our conflict is directly defined in term of location and uncertainty in this same parameter space.
A criterion of prior-data conflict

Definition and first examples
Our motivation here is to define what could be a Bayesian conflict in the parameter space Θ, when information comes from independent subjective (experts) and objective (data) sources. First we make the following assumption.
Assumption A. There is always a unique noninformative benchmark prior π J for the inference problem.
This assumption can appear somewhat vague, but a large amount of work has been dedicated to the elicitation and the choice of noninformative priors in applications (Kass and Wasserman 1996) .
The choice between noninformative priors lays on criteria like invariance to reparametrization or group actions, entropy or missing information maximization. The coverage matching properties of the priors (Ghoshal 1999) allow to discriminate between alternative candidates (Robert 2001 chap. 2 and 8). Again, because the Bayesian approach is often used in industry to overcome the precision limits of the frequentist approach, the best regularizer of the frequentist results should be made. However a significant feature of the KL-divergence is its invariance to reparametrization.
Other justifications can be found in Hartigan (1998) and Sinanović and Johnson (2007) , from both computational and analytic viewpoints.
Requirements. Expression (1) Example 2. Bernoulli model. Let y n be an i.i.d. n−sample from a Bernoulli distribution B r (θ). We assume on θ a prior Beta
yi. In this one-dimensional case, the Jeffreys prior is the most common choice of a benchmark prior (Clarke 1996) . Then π J is the B e (1/2, 1/2) density. Hence π J (θ|yn) is the Be(δn + 1/2, n − δn + 1/2) density. KL-divergences are explicit and can be found in Penny (2001) . Like Evans and Moshonov (2006, ex. 2), we choose (α, β) = (5, 20)
(so that E[θ] = 0.2) then we generate a sample of size n = 10 from the B r (θ 0 = 0.9) distribution:
we obtain DAC J (α, β|yn) = 1.102 and we conclude to a prior-data conflict ; modifying θ0 = 0.25, we obtain DAC J (α, β|y n ) = 0.1026 which means an agreement (as expected). Modifying π to be uniform (α = β = 1), we found a global agreement of any data set. All these results are similar to the EMo results (using usual threshold p−values).
However, EMo is less restrictive than DAC is this sense it rejects less priors. This behavior was noticed on all tested models. We set θ 0 = 0.7 and two sizes n = 10 and n = 5. 
Main features
Hierarchically specified priors. One can desire to check a potential conflict with the data when the prior is hierarchically specified. A key but uncomfortable requirement for the use of EMo is the existence of statistics which are ancillary for parts of the parameter. Defining a conflict with DAC, the following proposition makes easy the separate checks of the hierarchical levels and links them to the check of the whole prior. Thus, the agreement of the full prior is not a sufficient condition to obtain the agreement of any hierarchical prior. The opposite is clearly true. The proof is obvious and not reported here. An application is given in § 7.
Combination of multiple priors. Suppose to have checked m priors π1, . . . , πm. Next proposition indicates that any geometric weighted combination of the priors π i does not need to be checked if all priors are in agreement with the data. Possibly, some priors can be conflicting while the combination stays in agreement. Such a combination is typically used to obtain a global prior when several independent experts are available (Budescu and Rantilla 2000) . The proof is simple, using generalized Hölder inequalities, and can be found in Bousquet (2006) .
. . , π m be m priors on Θ, and let α 1 , . . . , α m be m weights such that
Denoting the marginal measures m
member of inequation (3) takes the form
in objective model selection about which a huge literature is dedicated. See Andrieu et al. (2001) for a review. Numerous approaches have been proposed to obtain default Bayes factors. The most famous is defining intrinsic Bayes factors (IBF, Berger and Pericchi 1996) . This methodology is deeply linked to the notion of minimal training samples (MTS) took among the observed data: 
where
removes the arbitrariness in the choice of cj. To reduce the dependence on MTS, using the arithmetic and expected arithmetic IBF,
makes sense (withθ n the MLE and E θ [.] the expectation under M(θ)). Other averages may be used as the geometric IBF or the median IBF . Finally, a nice property of the arithmetic IBF is its asymptotic equivalence with a "proper" Bayes factor arising from neutral intrinsic priors. This is a strong justification of the heuristic. For more precisions see Dass (2001) .
Thus the intrinsic heuristic is based on the use of small quantities of training data, which are chosen among the observed data (explaining the term intrinsic), to redefine a statistic which is formally valid but remains, in fact, difficult to assess. In the following, we are more interested in adapting DAC J than adapting DAC J 2 . Firstly because our context is not model selection, secondly because we want to preserve the intuitive sense of the criterion and its useful features listed in § 4.2. tioned to the learning information x(l). This conditioning must be done in the numerator as in the denominator of DAC to attenuate the impact of the disturbing information yielded by the MTS. In order to reduce the dependence on x(l), we use a cross-validation argument which leads to define the intrinsic (arithmetic) DAC criterion by (142.76, 142.99, 470.3, 419.09, 185.20, 84.41, 8.13, 27.15, 573.17, 17.12 
Issues and possible improvements
In an industrial context where n can be small and the data can be censored, the number L of available MTS of size q may be problematic since DAC AIJ can remain strongly dependent on some MTS containing outliers. Hence it is desirable to increase the number of MTS. Berger and Pericchi (2002) propose several ideas in this sense (especially when sufficient statistics can summarize the data information) and introduce the notion of sequential MTS (SMTS), including censored data.
Using the special "censored" Jeffreys prior π J c defined by De Santis et al. (2001) , instead of a standard noninformative prior π J , is a practical alternative for simple models as the exponential distribution: a censored data can become a MTS. However, the size of a MTS can remain high with respect to n, especially when dim Θ increases. Bousquet and Celeux (2006) proposed to modify the posterior priors into pseudoposterior priors using the fractional likelihoods defined by O'Hagan (1995 O'Hagan ( , 1997 . The noisy information carried through such priors can be considerably lower than the information carried through simple posterior priors. Applications have been done on lifetime models but more work is required to be generalized.
Notice the computational cost of the intrinsic adaptation: except in conjugate cases, L posterior samplings of π J (θ|y n (l)) are needed to obtain Monte Carlo estimates of DAC AIJ . Notorious MCMC algorithms (Robert and Casella 2004) can be used but importance sampling methods (Cappé et al. 2004 ) are more appropriate since the instrumental sampling function and the importance weights can be reused, provided π J (θ|y n (l i )) stays not far from π J (θ|y n (l j )) (i = j). Then the computational cost can be reduced.
Finally, summarizing our experiments using discrete models, what seemed a reasonable approx-imation in 1-and 2-dimensional cases (less than 10% L 2 relative error between agreement domains computed using DAC J and DAC AIJ , the prior variance being fixed) needed at least L ≥ 10 and n > 5q. Such empirical results have to be refined in a large variety of models.
Help to prior calibration
In previous examples we considered that π was entirely assessed. Its dispersion was set and a prior pointwise estimation θ e of θ (a central value as the prior mean) was checked with respect to the data location. Thus, we obtained an agreement domain for θe. When elicited from an expert subjective opinion, θ e reflects a personal viewpoint and is usually easy to assess (Daneskhah 2004).
But common prior uncertainty measures are more difficult to set. A prior elicited from the expert opinion, without critical work from the Bayesian analyst, can be strongly and dangerously informative (Garthwaite et al. 2005) . Besides it can happen that no credible information is available on the expert opinion. In those cases, a default rule for setting or limiting the prior uncertainty in a proper way is desirable. DAC can help to answer this question. Denoting ω the prior hyperparameter, default or boundary values for ω can be found such that DAC(ω|yn) = 1 under the constraint g(ω) = θ e where, typically, g(ω) = E [θ] . Acting in such a way, we choose the most informative prior in accordance with the expert opinion and not conflicting with the data.
This trade-off was first noticed in Ex. 5.
Example 6. Exponential model.
Let us take back the frame of Ex. 5. Consider again the prior λ ∼ G(a, ax e ) where a is the size of a virtual sample with mean x e and variance ax 2 e . Thus a embodies the expert uncertainty: calibrating π is choosing a. Denoteâ the strictly positive value such that DAC AIJ (â|yn) = 1. Existence and unicity ofâ can be proved using convexity arguments (Bousquet 2006) . The variations ofâ in function of xe, using the data from Ex. 5, are displayed in Figure 6 . A boundary line is placed at a = n = 10 since n is a natural upper bound for a such that the posterior distribution stays mainly directed by objective data information. Combining both limits gives to the Bayesian analyst a more precise view of the expert "reasonableness". Thus, if xe is far fromȳ = 207, the analyst can select default vague priors.
A recapitulative example
We consider the right-censored real lifetime data y n (n = 18) from Table 3 . They correspond to failure times or stopping times collected on some similar devices belonging to the secondary water circuit of nuclear plants (Bousquet and Celeux 2006) . For physical reasons and according to a large consensus, those data are assumed to arise from a Weibull distribution W(η, β) with density
The MLE is (ηn,βn) = (140.8, 4.51) with estimated standard deviationsσn = (7.3, 1.8). The high value ofβ n is unexpected because it reflects an unreasonable aging of the device (Dodson 2006) .
Two prior opinions on the lifetime are available, given by independent experts E1 and E2. They are summarized in Table 4 . E 1 's opinion is much more informative than E 2 's and both are right-shifted with respect to the data. Moreover the experts are not questioned at the same precision level. E 1 is a nuclear operator and speaks for a particular component while E2 can be seen as a component producer whose opinion takes into account a variety of running conditions. Since the Weibull distribution does not admit conjugate continuous prior (Soland 1969) , the posterior computation needs numerical approximations (Singpurwalla and Song 1988) . In our applications, we used adaptive importance sampling dedicated to missing data problems (Celeux et al. 2003) .
We consider the priors
Assuming that the device is submitted to aging, an usual domain of main variations for the values et al. 1998) . Since η is the 63rd percentile of the distribution, it is more tractable from the expert opinion than β. We translate approximatively the percentiles on X into the percentiles on η using the Weibull pdf, fixing β = 3. This translated knowledge and the corresponding values of a and b (assessed by least squares regression) are given in Table 4 .
In estimation, Sun (1997) recommended to use the reference prior π J whether one or both parameters are of interest (especially in small samples cases). Besides, when both parameters are of interest, π J is the unique second-order coverage matching prior. Since π J is improper, we have to compute DAC AIJ . An uncensored MTS x(l) is a couple of values (xi, xj) such that xi = xj and
is explicit, which considerably simplifies the computation. From ,
The corresponding noninformative prior is π
The computation of DAC AIJ needs the posterior density of π J conditionally to yn (ij) = (y (ij)1 , . . . , y (ij)n ) (the sample y n whose components x i and x j have been removed). Denote similarly x r(ij) the subsample of uncensored data. The posterior densities are
When the MTS contain censored data, we use the special Jeffreys prior introduced by De Santis et al. (1998) and elicited by Bousquet (2006b) . Denotẽ
From (2) we have
Thus, we can check π(η) separately from π(β). We chose L = 30 (among n(n − 1)/2 possible uncensored and censored MTS). For expert E1, we obtained DAC AIJ (a, b|yn) = 3.41. For expert E 2 , we obtained DAC AIJ (a, b|y n ) = 1.76. Thus, we detect a conflict between the data and the experts on the lifetime scale. Notice that the gamma prior on η, for expert E 1 , is very peaked and can be well approximated with a normal distribution (since a > 30). From (7), it is visible that no choice of π(β), even a flat prior, allows the complete prior π to be not conflicting. In an industrial context, such a situation must be noticed before the inference ; this discrepancy reflects a deep disparity between data and expert information.
The second expert opinion is not in this case. The scale parameter is affected by a similar conflict, but it remains possible to ensure that the complete prior is not conflicting: one must elicit
From the analyst viewpoint, the experts are optimistic with respect to the data. So they seem to favor a soft aging of the device (a simple reason is that they integrate some knowledge about the technical evolution in their opinions). 
Discussion
In this paper, we provide a characterization of the conflict between prior subjective knowledge and data information for the Bayesian decision-maker. We suggested two features for this definition. A)
In the same idea as Evans and Moshonov (2006) , both information can favor regions of the parameter space Θ that are far from each other. This is for instance the case, in reliability, where there is a time discrepancy between data that are formerly collected on a old device, and prospective expert opinions that take account of technical evolution. B) The subjective information introduced throughout the prior into the inference has not to overwhelm the data information, otherwise the Bayesian decision-making suffers of a lack of objectivity and threatens to lost its justification. The DAC criterion, based on Kullback-Leibler divergences between benchmark objective priors and the assessed prior, enables the Bayesian analyst to respect both point of views and check all floors of a hierarchised prior elicitation.
Since DAC is a binary criterion, it leads to a first, understandable diagnostic which can be statistically refined using the EMo procedure, uniquely based on the parameter location: a p−value close to 0.5 will discriminate between a conflict in location and a conflict in information uncertainty.
However, DAC indicates threshold values for the prior hyperparameters but such values remain undecidable for EMo. Thus a procedure of prior rejection or prior calibration based on DAC is devoid of the uncomfortable choice of a significance level.
There remain some difficulties to use DAC. When π J is improper, the intrinsic adaptation can suffer of the small size n and the high dimension of the model. Possible improvements have been highlighted, which are deeply linked to objective Bayesian model selection issues; future improvements of DAC adaptation should probably follow from improvements in this area.
Finally we think that the construction principle of DAC is an interesting alternative to the EMo procedure and a helpful complementary method to place in the toolkit of the Bayesian analyst.
In function of the available information about the conditions of the experiment and the expert credibility, he or she could correct the subjective beliefs or ask for other experiments to understand a detected discrepancy. An open issue could be detecting some outliers or too influential data in the sample by sequential computations of DAC, increasing or randomizing the dataset.
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Finally, the author would like to thank an unknown reviewer for several comments and critics which greatly help to improve the paper. log Γ(n + 1) = 1 2 log 2π + n + 1 2 log n − n + α 12n , where 0 < α < 1 which can be derived from Abramowitz and Stegun (1972, p. 258-260) and Artin (1964, p.24) , respectively, we obtain for n > max{1/2θ0, 1/2(1 − θ0)} that Then the asymptotic development of DAC J gives DAC J (α, β|Xn) = 1 + A θ 0 (α, β) log n 1 − Ψ(1/2) log n + Un B(α, β) √ n log n 1 − Ψ(1/2) log n To prove (2) for any 0 < q < 1, it is enough to control E [Vn] where Vn = Un [n(log n) q ] −1 . A sufficient condition is to show that E[V n ] → 0 when n increases. This can be done as follows.
